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Silk Roads of the Twenty-ﬁrst Century: The Cultural Dimension
Rosita Dellios*
Abstract
Much has been written about China’s grand
project of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the Silk Road
Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime
Silk Road—or the Belt and Road Initiative. It
is set to lift living standards through the provi-
sion of infrastructure and better connectivity
where these are lacking. While economic re-
sources are enumerated, and the maps of roads
and corridors have been drafted, the cultural
dimension is understudied. Beijing has not
helped in this regard. Apart from vague slo-
gans like ‘win–win cooperation’, ‘mutual re-
spect’ and ‘community of common destiny’,
there has been no concerted effort to showcase
China’s thought culture that is eminently suited
to precisely this type of venture. If collabora-
tion, even more than connectivity, is the neces-
sary glue for bringing the regions of the Belt
and Road together, then China needs to heed
the advice of its own great philosophers.
Key words: silk roads, Belt and Road
Initiative, Chinese philosophy, China’s
foreign policy, Bandung spirit
1. Introduction
China’s plans for building new silk roads of
development are impressive in their sheer
physical scope. Less appreciated is their poten-
tial impact in the ideational domain. Indeed,
China risks missing an opportunity to deploy
its vast cultural capacity towards human and
ecological security. This would make the dif-
ference between being associated with the en-
gineering feats of building ports, railways and
pipelines across the Indo-Eurasian hemisphere
and being embraced for a thought culture that
is particularly adept at addressing contempo-
rary challenges in the human and natural
world. The new silk roads when viewed as a
Confucian–Daoist–Buddhist construct would
transform the whole enterprise into a more gen-
uinely collaborative undertaking. These three
philosophies represent the main spiritual tradi-
tions informing Chinese culture. Their foun-
ders were great teachers whose ideas live on
and have a role to play as a spiritual compass
for the new silk roads initiative. Before elabo-
rating on this grand project of twenty-ﬁrst
century China, an introduction to the ancient
teachers who proved so inﬂuential in the devel-
opment of Chinese culture is in order.
2. China’s Thought Culture: A Brief
Survey
Confucius stands out as the leading ancient
philosopher of China. Latinised from Kong
Fuzi, meaning Great Master Kong,1 ‘Confu-
cius’ (whose actual name was Kong Qiu) lived
from 551 to 479 BCE during a time of
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prolonged upheaval with the decline of the
Zhou dynasty. This occurred during the pe-
riods known as ‘Spring and Autumn’ (circa
770–476 BCE) and the subsequent ‘Warring
States’ that only ended when China was uni-
ﬁed in 221 BCE. It was an era that gave rise
to numerous schools of thought as to how to
deal with the problems of the day. Like today’s
think tanks, each sought the ear of government.
Though the morally upright Confucian school
(or rujia: school of scholars) was not particu-
larly successful at the time of constant warfare,
it was ofﬁcially adopted by later imperial rulers
and was responsible for the intellectual basis of
China’s sophisticated bureaucracy.
Confucius’ key concepts are to be found in
an anthology of his sayings in the form of dia-
logues with his followers: The Analects. This
text shows that Confucius sought harmonious
order in the way society is governed (a theme
elaborated in the following texts). He repre-
sented himself as a ‘transmitter’ of wisdom
from the ancient Zhou sages, when in reality
he was also an innovator. For example, he in-
troduced ‘an aristocracy of learning and merit,
rather than family background’ so that ‘China
excelled as a bureaucratic polity that was able
to survive intact over the millennia’ (Dellios
& Ferguson 2013, p. 82). Yet his role as ‘trans-
mitter’ of the classical canon—by helping to
compile, edit and comment on the ﬁve classics
of Poetry, History, Rites, Changes and the
Spring and Autumn Annuls—was also highly
consequential in providing the contours of
Chinese thought culture. Confucianism was
advanced by Mencius (Meng Ke) in the fourth
century BCE and later by Xunzi. The former
with his concerns for peace and unity may be
viewed as the philosophical father of China’s
‘peaceful development’ policy in today’s
world. The latter, Xunzi, warned against what
he believed to be a natural tendency for people
to be self-seeking and conﬂictual. He saw this
as cause for educating them on the norms of
appropriate conduct (li) so that they could
become ‘civilised’.
Daoism (Taoism), by comparison, is more
attuned to nature as the ultimate instructor of
how to live life and seeks to ground the human
in a wider ‘cosmic order’. Its legendary
teacher, Laozi (or Lao Tzu, meaning Old Mas-
ter) is popularly depicted as riding an ox away
from the artiﬁcial world of human intrigue and
disturbance that characterised the times—a dis-
appointment he shared with Confucius. Rather
than persisting, as Confucius did, in trying to
convince the power brokers to heed his advice
and training a new generation of thinkers to
lead China back to civilisational norms, Laozi
simply withdrew to the wilderness. Before
leaving, however, he committed his thoughts
to the written word and thereby acquired a
certain kind of immortality. Laozi, the teacher,
who became Laozi the text, was more of a
Lazarus (to use a Western referent) than a dili-
gent Confucian transmitter. In encoding the
wisdom of a culture almost lost to its genera-
tion, Laozi revived from the dead the mysteries
that made China spiritually active.
The Laozi is also called the Daodejing (Tao
Te Ching), which means the Book of the Way
and Its Power. Power has many meanings,
and in this case, the word (de/te) also translates
as virtue. It is associated with following the
dao (the Way). The dao itself is described as
eternal and nameless and is accessed by an
attitude of wuwei or non-action. According to
the Daodejing (I.37): ‘The way never acts
[wuwei] yet nothing is left undone’.
Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu, 369–286 BCE) is
another great Daoist philosopher who brought
further insights into the nature of the dao,
showing by way of numerous examples the im-
portance of seeing situations from different
perspectives. He used parables such as his
dream that he was a butterﬂy and upon waking
did not know whether he was a man dreaming
he was a butterﬂy or the other way round (The
Zhuangzi, ch. 2). Another example concerns a
large leafy tree in the mountains, which man-
aged to survive the woodcutter’s axe. When
Zhuangzi asked the reason, the woodcutter told
him: ‘There’s nothing it could be used for!’
Zhuangzi concluded: ‘Because of its worth-
lessness, this tree is able to live out the years
Heaven gave it’ (The Zhuangzi, ch. 20). The
moral of the story is clear:
. . . if you were to climb up on the Way and its
Virtue and go drifting and wandering, neither
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praised nor damned, now a dragon, now a snake,
shifting with the times, never willing to hold to
one course only. Now up, now down, taking
harmony for your measure, drifting and
wandering with the ancestor of the ten thousand
things, treating things as things but not letting
them treat you as a thing – then how could you
get into any trouble? This is the rule, the method
of Shen Nung and the Yellow Emperor. [Chuang
Tzu 1968, ch. 20]
The third great teaching of traditional China
was Buddhism. Unlike the other two, Confu-
cianism and Daoism, it was not Chinese in
origin but actually came from India. With its
message of non-violence and respect for all
sentient beings, Buddhism was localised and
was occasionally adopted as the ruling imperial
ideology (Ferguson & Dellios 2017, p. 87).
Buddhism offers the concept of ‘skilful means’
(Sanskrit: upāya), which entails selecting the
best strategy for communicating the dharma
or teaching. Also notable is ‘codependent orig-
ination’ and its related idea of ‘emptiness’ (Skt:
sunyata). This holds that all phenomena arise
not of themselves but interdependently; there-
fore, they are ‘empty’ of their own existence
and remain contingent.
Although distinctive in their own way, each
of the three great teachings came together in a
complementary fashion to mould Chinese cul-
ture. This is well represented in the famous
depiction of Confucius, Laozi and the Buddha
standing together under a tree in friendly
fellowship (Figure S1). Their messages are
philosophically grounded in following a path
that does not veer to extremism or militancy.
Their spiritual styles are not of the
proselytising variety, but seek instead to en-
courage an inner cultivation or awareness.
They are not religions in the Western sense,
but their spiritual dimension can be discerned,
albeit within a wide spectrum from philosoph-
ical principles to faith-based dispositions:
Buddhism may be viewed as both a philosophy
and a religion. Daoism, too, bifurcates into
philosophical and religious branches. Even
philosophical Daoism has its mystical
connotations when considering the unfathomable
dao. Confucianism is concerned with ethics but
it, too, acquired an ineffable quality when it came
to the spiritual fruits of cultivating a moral
character – that is, the prize of self-realisation.
[Ferguson & Dellios 2017, p. 206]
Whatever is said of Confucian hierarchy (in
contradistinction to egalitarianism), Daoist
strategy (‘all warfare is based on deception’—
Sunzi’s The Art of War, I:18) and Buddhism’s
detachment from life (an Indic ‘otherworldli-
ness’), these are but selected prisms from a
larger body of thought through which the
teachings are seen. When seeking ethical
guidance, each has much to say about compas-
sion and helping rather than hindering the well-
being of others. This suggests that elements of
all three can be coordinated in new silk roads
thinking. Foremost in such thinking is avoid-
ance of China pursuing the role of the new
paramount power or hegemon in global affairs.
The very nature of Confucian–Daoist–
Buddhist thought culture precludes the idea
of one civilisation imposing itself on another.
Far from it, the process is dependent on mutu-
ality and ‘inﬁnite game’ dynamics (discussed
in the succeeding paragraphs). The ‘commu-
nity of common destiny’—a favoured formu-
lation by thwe Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) general secretary, China’s president
and ‘core’ leader, Xi Jinping—takes on a
richer meaning when seen in this light. If the
new silk roads project is not to be ‘derailed’
by incompetence and corruption, a scenario
that would have an equally damning impact
on its initiator, the CCP, much work needs to
be done to bring slogans to life. But ﬁrst, what
is this ‘silk roads’ project?
3. Silk Roads of the Twenty-ﬁrst Century
Formally called the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’
and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’,
President Xi Jinping announced the ﬁrst in
the Central Asian state of Kazakhstan and
the second in the archipelagic nation of
Indonesia, in September and October 2013, re-
spectively. They became known as One Belt
One Road (OBOR), and later as the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), in due recognition that
—like the old silk road—there was more than
one. Indeed, the network of old caravan trade
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routes was immortalised by the evocative term
‘silk road’ because Chinese silk was a much
sought after trading commodity. The term
was coined in 1877 by Prussian geographer,
Ferdinand von Richthofen, though the trade
routes themselves go back 2000 years. The
new silk roads of the twenty-ﬁrst century cross
the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, as
well as the seas that wash upon them.
The authoritative Vision and Actions on
Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (National
Development and Reform Commission—
NDRC 2015), identiﬁes ﬁve ‘roads’,
‘connecting the vibrant East Asia economic
circle at one end and developed European eco-
nomic circle at the other, and encompassing
countries with huge potential for economic
development’ (NDRC 2015, III. Framework,
para 2). Two of the ﬁve are land and sea routes
connecting China and Europe: one through
Central Asia and Russia; the other via the
South China Sea and Indian Ocean. A third
road connects China to the Middle East via
Central Asia; while a fourth takes in China,
Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian
Ocean. The ﬁfth route branches out from
China through the South China Sea and into
the South Paciﬁc (Figure S2). Then there are
the six economic corridors (NDRC 2015, III.
Framework, para 3): the Eurasian Land Bridge;
China–Mongolia–Russia; China–Central
Asia–West Asia; China–Indochina Peninsula;
China–Pakistan; and Bangladesh–China–In-
dia–Myanmar.
Covering 65 countries, 4.4 billion people
and approximately 40% of global GDP
(Hofman 2015), the scale of the BRI is impres-
sive, and it is growing. In 2015, the Interna-
tional Department of the CCP Central
Committee and the National Development
and Reform Commission assured a gathering
of diplomats and business leaders that the
BRI was not restricted to any particular geo-
graphic region or economic proﬁle: ‘The initia-
tives are open to all and countries that are
interested in the initiatives can participate in
them. What China has offered is only the vi-
sion’ (China Daily 2015). It has, however, also
set up the resources to bring the vision to life,
including the US$40 million Silk Road Fund
to encourage private sector investment and ini-
tiated the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) with its registered capital of US
$100 billion and membership of 57 countries
(including Australia). Another recently created
multilateral bank, the BRICS New Develop-
ment Bank, can be called on for funds. But
China’s own ‘policy banks’ are responsible
for much of BRI’s funding; the Export–Import
Bank of China is an even bigger lender than the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), having lent
over US$80 billion in 2015 compared with
the ADB’s US$27 billion (Kynge 2016); the
China Construction Bank has invested more
than US$300 billion in 176 Belt and Road
projects in the power, mining and transport
sectors (Hui 2016); while the China Develop-
ment Bank is investing over US$890 billion
in a variety of such projects from infrastructure
to agriculture (He 2015). Moreover, the whole
BRI enterprise has attracted the attention of
‘international pension funds, insurance compa-
nies, sovereign wealth funds, private equity
funds and others’ in their quest for ‘long-term
returns of 6 to 8 per cent’ (investment banker
Henry Tillman quoted in Kynge 2016).
The BRI goes beyond infrastructure and
economic calculations, as important as these
are in creating markets and improving peo-
ple’s standard of living. Its principles are
aligned to the United Nations Charter and
China’s own foreign policy foundations, the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (mu-
tual respect for each other’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression,
mutual non-interference in each other’s inter-
nal affairs, equality and mutual beneﬁt and
peaceful coexistence). As Vision and Actions
(NDRC 2015, II. Principles) elaborates, the
BRI is ‘open for cooperation’ beyond the
countries of the ancient Silk Road; it is ‘har-
monious and inclusive’, advocating inter-
civilisational tolerance; it abides ‘by market
rules and international norms’, and it ‘seeks
mutual beneﬁt’ so that ‘the wisdom and crea-
tivity, strengths and potentials of all parties’
can ﬂourish.
This theme has been repeated in other
venues and projects. For example, on the
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60th anniversary of the Asian–African Con-
ference in Bandung in 1955—commemorated
for the spirit of solidarity among newly inde-
pendent nations in Asia and Africa that did
not want to be part of the Cold War contest
—President Xi Jinping called for carrying
forward the Bandung Spirit. He put forward
a three-pronged approach: (i) deepening
Asian–African cooperation (which ‘is not a
closed and exclusive pursuit, but an open and
win-win endeavour’); (ii) expanding South–
South cooperation (through ‘more effective in-
stitutions and mechanisms’ and increasing ‘the
representation and voice of the developing
countries’); and (iii) advancing North–South
cooperation ‘From the strategic perspective of
building a community of common destiny for
mankind, North–South relations are not merely
an economic and development issue but one
that bears on the whole picture of world peace
and stability’ (Xi 2015).
A similar approach was evident in China’s
annual regional security conference, the
Xiangshan Forum. At its October 2016 meet-
ing, there was a call for ‘partnership’ in main-
taining security in the region (as distinct from
an alliance system), adhering to the ‘family
spirit’ in Asian culture, being inclusive (the
United States and its allies were welcome),
and avoiding a formal structure but instead
encouraging a ‘comprehensive, multi-level
and multilayered network’ (Chinese ofﬁcials
quoted in Ekman 2016). There is no formal
regionalism in the manner of the European
Union. Respect for state sovereignty is main-
tained, as is cultural and political diversity.
Chinese-style trans-regionalism encourages
common efforts—including ‘policy coordina-
tion’, ‘unimpeded trade’ and ‘ﬁnancial integra-
tion’ (NDRC 2015)—but remains aware of
environmental and societal needs (NDRC
2015, IV. Cooperation Priorities, paras 13, 14):
We should promote ecological progress in
conducting investment and trade, increase
cooperation in conserving eco-environment,
protecting biodiversity, and tackling climate
change, and join hands to make the Silk Road an
environment-friendly one.We welcome
companies from all countries to invest in China,
and encourage Chinese enterprises to participate
in infrastructure construction in other countries
along the Belt and Road, and make industrial in-
vestments there. We support localized operation
and management of Chinese companies to boost
the local economy, increase local employment,
improve local livelihood, and take social respon-
sibilities in protecting local biodiversity and eco-
environment.
Meanwhile, the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank states on its website (2014–2016)
that it ‘will put in place strong policies on
governance, accountability, ﬁnancial, procure-
ment and environmental and social frame-
works’. Objectives within its Environmental
and Social Framework (AIIB 2016, p. 2)
include the need to
• Ensure the environmental and social sound-
ness and sustainability of projects.
• Support integration of environmental and
social aspects of projects into the decision-
making process by all parties.
• Provide a framework for public consultation
and disclosure of environmental and social
information in relation to projects.
• Improve development effectiveness and
impact to increase results on the ground,
both short term and long term.
Beyond a commitment to international
norms, institutional best practice with regard
to sustainable development and improving the
lives of working people, it is the ideational
component that keeps recurring in the new silk
roads narrative. The Vision and Actions docu-
ment (NDRC 2015, III. Framework, para 1)
states that BRI is based on ‘win-win coopera-
tion that promotes common development’ and
includes ‘cultural inclusiveness’. This has be-
come a favoured formulation in Beijing’s artic-
ulations about its relationship with the world,
both near and far. Though appearing bland
and repetitive, its philosophical lineage is an-
cient. At the same time, it is of different stock
to that of the Western world order, with its
roots in Greco–Roman, Judeo–Christian and
Enlightenment values. This is where China
has failed to explain itself, if it is indeed willing
to do so—lest the ancient philosophies prove
too radical for Communist party rule which,
ironically, is also of Western philosophical
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provenance (Marxism). However, not to recog-
nise more fully the imprint of an alternative
thought culture limits BRI’s potential and
leaves China open to the criticism that the
BRI is merely an attempt by China to carve
out a sphere of inﬂuence. Such a sphere would
exclude and compete with the United States,
outﬂank India and marginalise Japan, all the
while acting to provide a still developing
China with resources and markets.
Undoubtedly there are geopolitical and
geo-economic beneﬁts accruing to China from
its new silk roads. As Callick (2016) noted,
under the BRI, ‘many international roads,
railways and ﬂights will lead not to Rome but
to Beijing’. This process, it is worth noting, is
as much about movement as destinations.
Eastern understandings of international and
interpersonal relations would travel too, much
as the old silk roads transmitted more than
goods across Eurasia and the Indian Ocean.
Ideas, religions, art and music ﬂowed across
the same networks as silk, tea, spices, furs
and technologies, creating a cross-fertilisation
of cultures and civilisations. So what are the
ideas from the twenty-ﬁrst century silk roads
that are currently exchanged like coins in a
busy marketplace? The contemporary use of
‘win–win’ terminology is especially instructive
as it begins as a theory of games in the West
and culminates in a Chinese discourse on mu-
tual gain, but its cultural worth is little known.
4. What is Implied by China’s ‘Win–Win’
Discourse?
‘Win–win’ is part of the language of game
theory that studies how players interact strate-
gically to achieve their preferred outcomes.
Although its insights can be found throughout
history (Ross 2016), game theory was
formalised as a ﬁeld of study in the mid-
twentieth century (von von Neumann &
Morgenstern 1944; and Nash 1950). It began
with a reliance on mathematical modelling,
but over time, game theory became both more
reﬁned and more broadly based (Ross 2016),
with applications to economics, politics and
the social sciences generally. Thomas D.
Schelling, an economist who became a
strategist in the nuclear age, stands out in this
regard. He won the Nobel Prize (along with
another scholar) in Economics in 2005, hav-
ing been recognised for ‘having enhanced
our understanding of conﬂict and cooperation
through game-theory analysis’ (Nobel Media
AB 2014). Schelling did this through a more
cognitive approach, as evidenced by his ‘the-
ory of interdependent decisions’ (Schelling
1980 [1960]). This theory holds that deci-
sion-makers do not operate in isolation, and
their decisions cannot be unilateral: ‘Even
two completely isolated individuals, who play
with each other in absolute silence and with-
out knowing each other’s identity, must tac-
itly reach some meeting of the minds’
(Schelling 1988 [1960], p. 163). In recognising
this, it is possible to devise strategies that take
into account the other, persuading them not to
inﬂict harm on oneself because of the conse-
quences that would follow.
An example of game theory, as told by
Schelling in his lectures at Harvard and
recalled by one of his students, Kinsley
(2005), is as follows:
So you’re standing at the edge of a cliff, chained
by the ankle to someone else. You’ll be released,
and one of you will get a large prize, as soon as
the other gives in. How do you persuade the other
guy to give in, when the only method at your
disposal – threatening to push him off the cliff –
would doom you both?
Answer: You start dancing, closer and closer to
the edge. That way, you don’t have to convince
him that you would do something totally
irrational: plunge him and yourself off the cliff.
You just have to convince him that you are
prepared to take a higher risk than he is of
accidentally falling off the cliff. If you can do
that, you win. You have done it by using
probability to divide a seemingly indivisible
threat. And a smaller threat can be more effective
than a bigger one. A threat to drag both of you off
the cliff is not credible. A threat to take a 60
percent chance of that same thing might be
credible.
Schelling’s contribution to game theory de-
pends on rational decision-making (even if
the pretence of irrationality is used as a ruse).
It also relies on the power of bargaining,
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persuasion and what Schelling calls ‘the ma-
nipulation of risk’. The last of these forms a
chapter in its own right in his 1966 classic
on nuclear deterrence, Arms and Inﬂuence
(Schelling 1966, ch. 3), as does ‘the diplo-
macy of violence’ (ch. 1), which captures
the whole notion of coercive bargaining.
Game theory can be applied to a range of
real-life situations and relationships, and not
only in negative ways for positive outcomes
of survival. Whether it be parenting, commerce
or global politics, the same principles can be
applied. Simply expressed, game theory speaks
of zero-sum games in which there is an abso-
lute winner and absolute loser (it is purely com-
petitive) and non-zero sum games in which
both sides lose or both sides win. To James P.
Carse, who takes the metaphor of ‘gamelike’
situations even deeper into philosophy and
psychology, the ﬁrst suggests a ﬁnite game
and the second an inﬁnite one. ‘A ﬁnite game
is played for the purpose of winning’, Carse
(1986, p. 3) states from the outset, ‘an inﬁnite
game for the purpose of continuing the play’.
Finite games such as sports, chess, debates,
earning an educational qualiﬁcation and war
have boundaries—both spatial and temporal
—in addition to the boundary represented by
ﬁxed rules. Their goal, as stated, is to win. An
inﬁnite game does not have boundaries, but
‘horizons’. It is continuous and dynamic. Finite
games can be played within inﬁnite ones, but
the reverse does not hold: an inﬁnite game can-
not be played within a ﬁnite one. ‘Inﬁnite
players regard their wins and losses in what-
ever ﬁnite games they play as but moments in
continuing play’ (Carse 1986, p. 7). Inﬁnite
games are win–win or lose–lose insofar as the
players are interdependent. This means ‘they
either succeed or fail together’, as East–West
philosopher Roger T. Ames (2007) explains.
He offers the example of ‘a mother [who] is
resolutely committed to strengthening the rela-
tionship she has with her son so that together
they can manage whatever increasingly com-
plex problems their lives lived together might
present’. This is an inﬁnite game because ‘the
success and prosperity of mother and son is
coterminous and mutually entailing’ (Ames
2007, para 8).
Inﬁnites games come closest to conveying
the Chinese cultural understanding of ‘win–
win’ cooperation. As deployed in affairs of
state, it creates an impression of being a
borrowed or recently learned concept. When
China began using the ‘win–win’ formulation
in its security discourse in 1997, it did so
within a multilateral body sympathetic to col-
lective security: that of the ASEAN Regional
Forum. China was seen as having been
socialised into this modality (for example, by
Johnston 2008, pp. 172–3). However, ‘win–
win’ and the associated ‘new security concept’
that appeared in China’s defense white papers
from 1998 were not new; nor was China’s
choice of friends with whom to share such a
concept. In the ideologically riven age of the
newly emerged People’s Republic of China
(PRC), there was a commitment to a foreign
policy of mutuality. As noted earlier, there
were the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexis-
tence, and they were incorporated in the ﬁnal
communiqué of the 1955 Bandung Confer-
ence. The Five Principles were also included
in the PRC Constitution in 1982.
What was new about China’s choice of
slogans and the occasions for their employ-
ment was the threat-assessed environment.
Deng Xiaoping—whose leadership was re-
sponsible for introducing China’s reforms—
saw no major threat brewing, but rather a great
opportunity for China to develop. It needed the
cooperation of others and a period of peace for
this undertaking. Adopting the language
(though not the mathematical abstractions) of
game theory, China sought to emphasise that
it did not favour an international system in
which there were winners and losers. Such a
system, it noted, was unsuited to a globalised
interdependent world and harked back to a
‘Cold War mentality’. Although such a
mindset had indeed become outmoded, the
criticism from a game theory perspective, as
developed by Schelling and his colleagues,
does not hold for the logic of nuclear deter-
rence. Far from being a zero-sum game, the
deterrent effect of nuclear weapons was such
that survival or destruction was mutually
assured. (Adapting Zhuangzi, the ‘usefulness’
of nuclear weapons was their non-use.) This
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describes a non-zero-sum game. What Beijing
is really saying is that this is not a game—at
least not of the ﬁnite variety. The new security
concept, articulated in the PRC’s ﬁrst defence
white paper of 1998, and later as a position
paper, expressed the need ‘to rise above
one-sided security and seek common security
through mutually beneﬁcial cooperation …
on the basis of common interests’ (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, PRC 2002).
By the twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy slo-
gan of a ‘new type of major-country relations’
sought to ensure that China would be seen as
rising or developing peacefully, not as a con-
tender for power at the expense of the United
States. Whatever Beijing’s intentions, it did
not need a cloaked containment policy. The
2012 US ‘pivot to Asia’ was widely seen to
be nothing less. While the BRI of 2013 may
be viewed as China’s pivot westward, it none-
theless goes beyond the ﬁniteness of a game
won or lost, or the prospect of an opponent
contained or deterred within an established
perimeter. At its most expansive, the BRI
manifests the deeply ingrained Chinese
philosophy of correlativity. Unlike the West’s
focus on the autonomous individual, the
solitary ‘one’, Chinese thought gravitates to a
mutually regarding ‘two’. The key Confucian
concept of ren (benevolence, humaneness) is
made up of the character for person (⋏) and
the character for two (二); thus two people.
The qualities of benevolence and humaneness,
that make us human, come about through our
experience of interacting with another. This
is why the Confucian rites (li) are meant to
be more than socially sanctioned ritual. As
the outer expression of one’s inner ren (the
method of showing ren), li represents consid-
erate behaviour towards others (Dellios &
Ferguson 2013, p. 109). Like good manners,
the intent is a display of thoughtfulness to-
wards the other person. In Confucianism, this
‘other-regarding’ attitude is also related to
shu (reciprocity): ‘What you would not want
for yourself, do not do to others’ (The Analects
15:23). It is not a self-sacriﬁcing posture, nor a
self-referential one in deciding another’s treat-
ment but more the case of using one’s judge-
ment in evaluating another’s perspective.
This shows that a Confucian does have
autonomy but within a relational context in
which the values of respect, empathy and co-
humanity are cultivated (Chan 2000). Add to
this the Daoist teaching of non-interference
through non-action (wuwei), which allows for
spontaneity (ziran) in one’s responsiveness to
the other, and there arises a more profound ap-
preciation of the non-interference and cooper-
ation principle within the win–win statement.
In reality, not doing unto others what you
would not want for yourself, and allowing
for wuwei to nourish ziran, permits a process
of productive mutuality that is greater than
the sum of its parts. This is win–win from a
Chinese philosophical perspective which, in
its cultural embeddedness, makes it a living
philosophy or disposition.
In international relations terms, it points to
the need to build trust and to think of ‘mutual
respect and mutual beneﬁt’ as more than
diplomatic veils for the pursuit of national
self-interest. Under Confucian teaching, there
is no national interest, but mutual interest.
What about opposition? The Analects (4:18,
18:1, 19:10) advises remonstrance (jian). As
Mattice (2014, pp. 79–80) explains, it is ‘an
earnest and careful presentation of reasons for
opposition that is structured around the rela-
tionship of those involved, and which points
out or demonstrates the problem in question’.
This is similar to shu. The idea of opposition
leads to the nature of argument. According to
the Confucian philosopher, Xunzi, there is a
distinction between contentiousness and coop-
erative argument; one functions for its own
sake while the other pursues a matter of com-
mon concern (Cua in Mattice, pp. 33–34).
Thus, in Confucianism, a sense of reciprocity
and common interests does not negate differ-
ence and argument. Harmony in the Chinese
sense includes opposition as a productive
force. This may be compared with the institu-
tion of a ‘loyal opposition’ in parliamentary
democracy. It is a form of remonstrance that,
when viewed as a non-zero-sum game, allows
the ‘losers’ a genuine role in ensuring the
‘winners’ remain accountable. Rather than a
Hegelian–Marxist dialectics of struggle, there
is a yinyang dialectics of harmony. One side
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needs the other to maintain the system. More
than that, one contains an element of the other,
even though they are different. This explains
their dynamic interactive nature.
It also shows an absence of hierarchy, yin is
not better than yang, and vice-versa:
Instead, yinyang is emblematic of valuational
equality rooted in the uniﬁed, dynamic, and
harmonized structure of the cosmos. As such, it
has served as a heuristic mechanism for
formulating a coherent view of the world
throughout Chinese intellectual and religious
history. [Wang n.d.]
While hierarchy is often noted as a deﬁning
feature of Confucianism (the ‘prism’ through
which it is often viewed), its associations with
the yinyang concept—which is fundamental
to Chinese philosophy and does not belong to
any one school of thought—suggest that all is
not what it seems ideationally. Confucian
thought is far more complex than stereotypes
suggest. To be sure, it has much in common
with Daoism, while both are distinctive in their
teachings. Both value non-interference, and
while Confucianism is associated with ritual,
its trajectory is also towards spontaneity. Con-
fucius’ own life stages reﬂect this:
At ﬁfteen, I set my heart on learning. At thirty, I
know where I stand. At forty, I had no more
doubts. At ﬁfty, I knew the will of Heaven [life’s
purpose]. At sixty, my ear was attuned [that is,
my moral sense is well-developed]. And at
seventy, I follow my heart’s desire without
breaking any rule. [The Analects 2: 4]
Such internalisation of the moral universe sug-
gests that one may act without imposing one’s
will. In other words, the action of non-action
(wei wuwei) allows for an inﬁnite gamemodal-
ity and is distinctive from its more commonly
used strategic meaning in which a particular
goal is desired—such as ‘speedy victory’ in
war employing various ways and means, in-
cluding the art of deception. This is Sunzi’s ad-
vice when conducting a ﬁnite game (The Art of
War, ch. 2: ‘Waging War’). And yet, there is a
relationship from one level to another. A ﬁnite
activity is not without a context of a larger
plan: battles and military operations do not
exist in isolation of grand strategy, which
continues into the peace and precedes war. It
is a case of ﬁnite games within inﬁnite games.
5. What Does China Need to Do? What
Would Its Cultural Sages Prescribe?
China is already doing a great deal, in true
Daoist fashion, by not appearing to be doing
anything much at all. It keeps a relatively low
proﬁle in its global presence and massive in-
vestments, except for ﬁnite contests of demon-
strative actions in the South China Sea. These
have drawn so much attention that one may
ask whether the usefulness of ‘island-building’
(to enhance China’s claims) in this contested
sea has been rendered useless by fragmenting
the ‘community of common destiny’. How-
ever, even if it has, lessons learned and altered
relationships have prepared the players for a
new round of possibilities. One of the possibil-
ities is to turn the South China Sea into an ex-
ample of ‘ecological civilisation’2 that extends
across the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.
Appropriately, water is a symbol of the dao:
its softness and ﬂexibility belie its power to
change the whole landscapes through which it
ﬂows. Chinese dredgers may have built a
‘Great Wall of Sand’ in the South China Sea
(Browne 2016), but a Daoist-informed geopol-
itics would be longer lasting. By encouraging
sustainable ﬁshing and preserving the ecologi-
cal balance of the waters in its neighbourhood,
China would not only be at the forefront of en-
hancing a precious resource. (On ﬁsheries as a
serious issue in South China Sea, see Maritime
Awareness Project 2016). It would also attract a
genuine ‘community of common destiny’
whose civilisational credentials would rely as
much on its relationship to the environment as
with the human world.
2. Launched by the 18th Central Committee of the CCP in
November 2013, the term ﬁrst appeared in government
documents at the 17th Party Congress in 2007, and in
2012, ‘ecological civilisation’ was included in the CCP’s
constitution. It is seen as the overarching vision of China’s
comprehensive development so that it can balance its needs
into the future.
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From a Confucian perspective, the Silk
Road Economic Belt provides an opportunity
to turn Eurasia—the site of the geopolitical
‘great game’ between empires of the early
twentieth century—into an inﬁnite game arena.
This would unfold both philosophically and
structurally (via multilateral organisations)
and with ‘development’ as an expanded term
to include a cultivation of the other as well as
the self, of economic beneﬁts in the presence
of cultural and environmental awareness.
With Buddhism’s contribution of codepen-
dent origination, the entire Belt and Road
network can be imagined as a mandala.3 It
would comprise many distinctive but inte-
grated and interrelating cultures. Like the
Bandung Spirit, which Xi Jinping evoked on
the 60th anniversary of the Asian–African
Conference, a regional consciousness of being
part of a whole would be encouraged. More-
over, the mandalic region’s noted characteristic
of ‘adaptability’ suggests that it could ‘make
sense of just about anything that was originally
“foreign”’ (Reynolds 1995, p. 427). This is
already true of China. Having borrowed
Buddhism from India, China acquired a
Buddhist identity in addition to a Daoist and
Confucian one. Later, it added the layer of so-
cialism. Its new silk roads identity is still being
formed, but unless Beijing invests serious
effort in deploying its cultural assets into the
BRI, it risks dire criticisms—whether justiﬁed
or not—of unleashing the dark side of globali-
sation (including inequality and exploitation)
into its surrounding regions, all the while
making a proﬁt: a ‘win–win’ ratio (such as
70/30) that favours China.
On the other hand, if China does begin to
implement policies that accord with its own
best traditions and which align with interna-
tional norms of transparency and sustainability,
there are risks that the BRI will still create
problems for Beijing. One risk is of an
unfavourable comparison of BRI governance
with China’s own restrictive political system.
There is also the risk of Beijing being accused
of seeking to resurrect the old Chinese world
order, in which Chinese cultural concepts
prevailed in diplomacy. Neither of these need
be a source of undue consternation. The BRI
with its caveats of win–win cooperation and
its involvement of partners at home and
abroad, public and private, is showing the
CCP’s adaptability beyond the bounds of
Marxist orthodoxy. This was always the case,
from Mao to Deng to Xi. Relatedly, the con-
cern of China imposing its own values as the
Middle Kingdom suggests a return to a world
order that cannot be replicated. However,
Chinese thought culture is not constrained by
history. Far from it, it can be seen as the source
of China’s continuity. With the new silk roads
project, China stands to inspire an ideational
domain of as much if not greater beneﬁt as
the physical one of economic development.
In realising the cultural dimension of the silk
roads of the twenty-ﬁrst century, China needs
to set up educational and cultural institutions
that act as think tanks and temples of learning
across many languages and philosophical
systems. Confucius Institutes, of which there
were 480 around the world in 2014 teaching
Chinese language and culture, need to evolve
into genuine institutes of Confucian learning.
Indeed, the creation of collaborative institutes
that explore wider intellectual worlds in a more
critical fashion would serve the BRI well.
Daoist and Buddhist thought systems can also
be deployed in problem-solving when it comes
to the environment and society. Somework has
begun in these directions, including the con-
cept of an ‘ecological civilisation’ that employs
Chinese philosophy for sustainable develop-
ment; the expansion of cultural centres in the
BRI countries, from 20 to 50 in 2020 (Deng
2015); and domestically, there is an active
Chinese cultural studies scene in universities
and think tanks. These include afﬁliations with
foreign institutes of Chinese or East–West
Studies. Likewise, China has initiated the
Universities Alliance of the New Silk Road as
a new ‘higher education platform’, which has
begun to engage 60 universities from 22
countries (Sharma 2015). The important point
is that China and its partners will need to
actively engage this knowledge and awareness
3. Sanskrit for sacred circle, with the Buddha at the centre;
but can also represent a political circle of relationships. See
Dellios (2003).
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at an early stage as BRI progresses. In this way,
the silk roads of the future may well resemble
those of the past in that they were multicultural
and better aligned to Confucian, Daoist and
Buddhist templates of thought.
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